feat(pointer): keep the first final state, and look before taking one

Cargo.toml

@@ -239,6 +239,11 @@ webrtc-direct = [
 # streams without copying. Drop both once releases include them.
 saorsa-core = { git = "https://github.com/WithAutonomi/saorsa-core", rev = "c0022b871961c7f373f2ccde815385816962de98" }
 saorsa-transport = { git = "https://github.com/WithAutonomi/saorsa-transport", rev = "1e6eb1a3bc5b8b7f51c6773b11a152ae50d87320" }
+# The published 3.1.0 carries pointers (ADR-0016) but not the final state this
+# change relies on (ADR-0018). A rev, not a branch, so the pin is immutable.
+# Drop it once a release includes the companion change. Versions are bumped at
+# release.
+ant-protocol = { git = "https://github.com/WithAutonomi/ant-protocol", rev = "ab459e52b3db19c0db15ed33a97fe6282dfd4ae0" }
 
 [profile.release]
 lto = true

docs/adr/ADR-0019-pointer-audits-serve-the-record-round-one-bound.md

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+# ADR-0019: Pointer audits serve the record round 1 bound
+
+- **Status:** Proposed
+- **Date:** 2026-09-29
+- **Decision owners:** Anselme (@grumbach)
+- **Reviewers:** <pending>
+- **Supersedes:** none. It amends one point of ADR-0016, "Updates between the
+  rounds", and leaves the rest of ADR-0016 as written.
+- **Superseded by:** none
+- **Related:** ADR-0002 (audit), ADR-0009 (audit families), ADR-0016 (pointers)
+
+## Context
+
+A storage audit is two rounds (ADR-0002, ADR-0009). Round 1 reports, for every
+leaf of the audited subtree, a root over the bytes the node holds, keyed by the
+audit's fresh nonce. Round 2 then opens a few of those leaves, and the node must
+serve bytes that reproduce the root round 1 reported.
+
+For a pointer (ADR-0016) those bytes are the whole signed record, and the owner
+may replace the record at any time with a paid update. ADR-0016 covers one
+update between the rounds: the store keeps the record an update replaced for
+five minutes, and round 2 serves it beside the new one. It accepts the case of
+two updates:
+
+> Two updates to one pointer inside the same audit would fail an honest holder,
+> and would take the owner two paid updates within seconds of each other.
+
+Two things make that worth closing rather than accepting.
+
+- **The failure is charged to the wrong party.** The auditor reports
+  `DigestMismatch`, a confirmed failure, and the holder takes the trust penalty
+  for its owner's activity. Nothing the holder did was wrong.
+- **It can be aimed.** An owner who is also a close-group auditor of the holder
+  knows exactly when its round 1 has been answered, and two paid updates cost
+  two writes, about 0.013 ANT each on the 990-node pointer testnet. ADR-0016
+  already notes that an owner can grind a node id beside its own pointer. That
+  turns an accepted edge case into a cheap way to penalise a chosen honest
+  neighbour.
+
+The cause is narrow. Round 2 serves the record held now and the one last
+replaced, because the node has not kept what round 1 bound and so cannot tell
+which record it owes. After two updates neither of those is the one round 1
+read.
+
+## Decision Drivers
+
+- An honest holder must not take a confirmed failure because its owner updated
+  the pointer, however often.
+- No wire change and no change to what the auditor accepts. Pointers have not
+  shipped in any release yet, but the smaller change is still the better one.
+- Memory stays bounded against an auditor that opens many round-1 sessions, and
+  running out of it must never turn into a confirmed failure either.
+
+## Considered Options
+
+1. **Keep ADR-0016 as written.** Cheapest, and it leaves the failure above.
+2. **Serve every record held since round 1.** It needs a larger per-item cap
+   than `MAX_POINTER_RECORDS_PER_ITEM`, so the auditor's check changes, and any
+   cap is still one more paid update away from failing.
+3. **Remember what round 1 bound, and serve that record.** Round 1 already
+   reports a nonced root per pointer leaf. The node keeps those roots in the
+   round-1 session it already holds, and round 2 serves the one record,
+   current or replaced, whose root matches.
+
+## Decision
+
+We will take option 3.
+
+- **The session keeps round 1's roots.** When a round-1 proof is about to be
+  sent, the single-use session it opens keeps the nonced root reported for each
+  pointer leaf, keyed by address: 64 bytes of key and root a pointer, and
+  nothing for chunks. A session whose proof then fails to send keeps them until
+  it expires, as it keeps its place today.
+- **The store keeps every replaced record, for longer.** Every record an update
+  replaces is kept in memory, not only the last one, for ten minutes rather
+  than five. A round 1 can read a pointer at its start and take as long as the
+  auditor waits for the largest subtree (1,024 leaves), about seven minutes
+  with the default configuration, before its session even opens, and round 2
+  then has the session's two minutes. A test ties the ten minutes to those two
+  figures for the default configuration; an auditor configured to wait longer
+  than that can outlast the record. The overall cap stays 2,048 records, about
+  11 MB, oldest first wherever it is, and records past the ten minutes are
+  dropped at each prune pass even when no update comes to drop them.
+- **Round 2 serves the record that matches.** Among the record held now and the
+  replaced records kept for that address, it serves the one whose nonced root,
+  under the audit's own nonce, is the root round 1 reported. That is a single
+  record, so the auditor's check and the item cap are unchanged.
+- **When it cannot, it says so.** If the root matches nothing kept, because the
+  record aged out or was evicted, round 2 is rejected as `Transient`, as for a
+  local read error. That is the auditor's timeout lane: no trust penalty, but
+  the auditor forgets the holder's standing as a proven holder of every key
+  under the pinned commitment, until the holder passes again. A node that no
+  longer holds the pointer reports it absent, which is a confirmed failure, as
+  before, whatever replaced records it still keeps: those prove what round 1
+  read, not that the pointer is still held.
+- **The roots are bounded, by admission.** Every live session together keeps
+  at most `MAX_SESSION_POINTER_BINDINGS` (65,536) roots, 4 MiB of payload
+  before the maps' own overhead. A round 1 whose roots would not fit withholds
+  its proof and answers `Transient` instead, which puts it in the auditor's
+  timeout lane with no trust penalty; staying silent would read as a peer that
+  did not answer. Roots are never stripped from a live session to make room:
+  its round 2 is owed them. A whole session can still be evicted when the
+  session count reaches `MAX_SUBTREE_SESSIONS`, as before this change, and its
+  round 2 then goes to the timeout lane. Without a root for a pointer, round 2
+  would reject it as `Transient` rather than guess, since the replaced records
+  kept are capped and an empty history proves nothing, but a session this node
+  opened always holds a root for every pointer it proved.
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+
+- Updates between the rounds no longer fail an honest holder, however many.
+  What remains are local limits, and none is a confirmed failure: the bound
+  record evicted by more than 2,048 paid updates across the node's pointers
+  inside ten minutes is reported as `Transient`, and so is a round 1 over the
+  roots budget.
+- Round 2 serves one pointer record where it could serve two, so it is smaller.
+- The auditor, the wire format and the subtree-audit protocol id are unchanged.
+
+### Negative / Trade-offs
+
+- Round-1 sessions carry state they did not before, bounded by the budget
+  above. Auditors that open pointer-heavy sessions faster than they complete
+  can fill it, and later round 1s are then answered `Transient` until it
+  drains. That costs the holder those audits' credit, not trust, much as the
+  round-1 concurrency and work budgets already can.
+- A responder that returns `Transient` is not proved wrong. That was already
+  so, since any responder can report a local read error, so this gives a
+  dishonest node no answer it did not have.
+- One address can hold many replaced records inside the window, and round 2
+  hashes each candidate it checks for that address. The global cap bounds that
+  work to about 11 MB of keyed BLAKE3 per opened pointer, and filling it takes
+  that many paid updates.
+- Replaced records are kept twice as long, so under a high update rate the
+  2,048-record cap is reached sooner. The memory bound itself is unchanged.
+
+### Neutral / Operational
+
+- A restart drops every session, as before, so a round 2 that follows one goes
+  to the graced timeout lane, as it already did.
+
+## Validation
+
+- `several_updates_between_the_rounds_do_not_fail_an_honest_holder`: three
+  updates between the rounds fail with `DigestMismatch` before this change and
+  pass after it, and round 2 serves exactly the record round 1 read.
+- `round_two_serves_the_record_round_one_read_across_several_updates` (e2e):
+  both rounds sent over QUIC to a live node, with three updates between them.
+  It fails if the node stops handing round 1's roots to its session.
+- `a_bound_record_no_longer_held_is_unavailable_not_failed`,
+  `without_the_bound_root_a_pointer_is_unavailable_not_failed`,
+  `subtree_session_carries_pointer_bindings_within_the_budget`,
+  `past_the_cap_the_oldest_replaced_record_anywhere_goes_first` and
+  `a_replaced_record_outlives_the_slowest_audit` cover the limits above.
+- In production, a pointer holder's `DigestMismatch` rate should not rise with
+  the update rate of the pointers it holds. A rise in `Transient` round-2
+  rejections naming a pointer means the retention or session budget is being
+  reached.
+
+## Notes for AI-assisted work
+
+AI tools may help draft this ADR, but **must not mark it Accepted without human
+review**. Accepted ADRs are immutable: create a new superseding ADR rather than
+editing an Accepted ADR.

docs/adr/README.md

@@ -37,3 +37,5 @@ See [`TOOLING.md`](./TOOLING.md) for `adrs`, `adr-kit`, and AI harness setup.
 - [ADR-0015: Direct browser clients over WebRTC Direct](./ADR-0015-direct-browser-clients-over-webrtc-direct.md)
 - [ADR-0016: Pointers — paid mutable references with an immutable owner](./ADR-0016-pointers-immutable-owner.md)
 - [ADR-0017: Bounded fresh-replication offers and copy-free message sends](./ADR-0017-bounded-fresh-offers-and-copy-free-sends.md)
+- [ADR-0018: Pointer ownership transfer by final redirection](./ADR-0018-pointer-transfer-by-final-redirection.md)
+- [ADR-0019: Pointer audits serve the record round 1 bound](./ADR-0019-pointer-audits-serve-the-record-round-one-bound.md)

src/node.rs

@@ -272,11 +272,10 @@ impl NodeBuilder {
         };
 
         // ADR-0016: pointers replicate through the same engine. The PUT handler
-        // hands each newly stored paid state to it on this channel.
+        // hands each newly stored paid state to it, and asks it before taking
+        // a final state (ADR-0018).
         if let Some(service) = protocol.pointer_service() {
-            let (writes, fresh_writes) = tokio::sync::mpsc::unbounded_channel();
-            service.attach_fresh_writes(writes);
-            engine.with_pointers(service.store().clone(), fresh_writes);
+            engine.with_pointer_service(service);
         }
 
         // ADR-0004: wire the engine's commitment state as the quote generator's

src/pointer/mod.rs

@@ -3,10 +3,18 @@
 //! Implements `docs/adr/ADR-0016-pointers-immutable-owner.md`.
 //!
 //! A pointer is a mutable, owner-signed reference stored at an address derived
-//! from the owner's public key. Ownership is fixed at creation: there is no
-//! transfer, no lineage, no certificates and no key rotation. That choice is
-//! what lets the design be this small — the owner key is inlined in the
-//! record, so validating a pointer needs nothing but the pointer.
+//! from the owner's public key. The owner key is fixed at creation: there is no
+//! lineage, no certificates and no key rotation. That choice is what lets the
+//! design be this small — the owner key is inlined in the record, so
+//! validating a pointer needs nothing but the pointer.
+//!
+//! What the address resolves to can still be handed over for good
+//! (`docs/adr/ADR-0018-pointer-transfer-by-final-redirection.md`): a state at
+//! the final counter is replaced by nothing, so once a node holds one pointing
+//! at the new owner's pointer, the former owner cannot take it back there. The
+//! store gets that from the merge rule; the service adds one look at the close
+//! group before taking a final state, so a node that had not heard of the
+//! first refuses a second one when a peer proves the first in time.
 //!
 //! # What lives here
 //!
@@ -53,8 +61,8 @@ pub mod store;
 
 pub use ant_protocol::pointer::{
     pointer_address, state_id_for_body, ParsedPointer, Pointer, PointerError, PointerState,
-    PointerTarget, PointerTargetKind, DATA_TYPE_POINTER, POINTER_BODY_LEN, POINTER_FORMAT_VERSION,
-    POINTER_WIRE_LEN, TARGET_WIRE_LEN,
+    PointerTarget, PointerTargetKind, DATA_TYPE_POINTER, FINAL_COUNTER, POINTER_BODY_LEN,
+    POINTER_FORMAT_VERSION, POINTER_WIRE_LEN, TARGET_WIRE_LEN,
 };
-pub use service::PointerService;
+pub use service::{FinalStateWitness, FinalityCheck, PointerService};
 pub use store::{PointerStore, PutOutcome};